Abstract-An -word over a finite alphabet of cardinality is called a descendant of a set of words if every coordinate , is contained in the set . A code is said to have the -IPP property if for any -word that is a descendant of at most parents belonging to the code, it is possible to identify at least one of them. From earlier works, it is known that -IPP codes of positive rate exist if and only if . We introduce a robust version of IPP codes which allows error-free identification of parents in the presence of a certain number of mutations, i.e., coordinates in that can break away from the descent rule, taking arbitrary values from the alphabet or becoming completely unreadable. We show existence of robust -IPP codes for all and some positive proportion of such coordinates. We uncover a relation between the hash distance of codes and the IPP property and use it to find the exact proportion of mutant coordinates that permits identification of pirates with zero probability of error in the case of size-2 coalitions.
coalition of users, called pirates, pool their data copies in order to create an unauthorized copy of the contents. The pirates attempt to obfuscate their identities by acquiring information about the fingerprints from comparing their copies of the data and forming a new fingerprint for the unauthorized copy or a pirate decoder in the broadcast system. The contents distributor faces the task of designing the fingerprints in a way that will enable him to trace at least some members of the coalition from the observed unauthorized copy. The collection of fingerprints constructed by the distributor forms a fingerprinting code.
In this paper, we consider fingerprinting schemes that support unconditional identification of the pirates, i.e., identification with zero error probability. Fingerprinting codes with such functionality are said to have the IPP and are called IPP codes. They were introduced by Chor et al. [16] and Hollmann et al. [23] and are used in the design of traitor-tracing schemes [9] , [14] , [16] , [30] .
To describe the context and the results of this study, we proceed to give a formal definition of the fingerprinting problem. Let be the set of all -words (vectors) over a finite alphabet of size . A subset of is called a code of length . A -subset is called a coalition of size . In applications, the elements of serve as fingerprints of the users of the system. A collusion attack occurs when several uses (pirates) form a coalition to create a new fingerprint with the purpose of making it impossible to identify any members of based on observing . The vector is formed as a function of (the attack map). The general problem considered in the paper is design of codes resilient to collusion attacks. To give a formal definition of the attack, we need to introduce several concepts.
Let be the set of the th coordinates of the elements of . Coordinate is called undetectable for if all vectors in have the same value in it, i.e., if , and is called detectable otherwise. Denote by the set of detectable coordinates for the coalition .
Let be a coalition and let be the fingerprint (attack) created by it and suppose that for all . Then, the set of possible attack vectors for forms the subset (1) called the narrow-sense envelope of the coalition [5] and denoted by . The elements of are called descendants of , and for any of the descendants , the elements of are called its parents. The -envelope of the code is defined as follows:
0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE Definition 1 [23] : The code is a -IPP code if for any , it is possible to find at least one of its parents, i.e., if (2) One of the main problems associated with IPP codes is bounding the cardinality of a -IPP code . In this paper, we are concerned with the case of large and fixed and . Call the number the rate of the code and let
We are interested in establishing conditions for the existence of sequences of codes of increasing length and positive rate (called good IPP codes below). It is easily seen that for . Hollmann et al. [23] proved that for . More generally, Barg et al. [6] showed that for all . These papers also provided characterizations of 2-and 3-IPP codes, respectively. An improved lower bound on was given by Alon et al. [1] , while upper bounds on the cardinality of -IPP codes were derived in [2] and [10] .
In a related earlier work, Boneh and Shaw [15] introduced a broader class of attack maps. Define the wide-sense envelope of the coalition as (3) (any symbols of or erased symbols * are allowed in the detectable coordinates). Codes that support reliable recovery of the pirates for this problem are called collusion-secure or fingerprinting. As shown in [5] and [15] , under this definition, unconditional recovery of pirates is impossible. Moreover, a single code cannot guarantee low error probability of identification, and it is necessary to use a family of codes parametrized by a random key. Such code families are somewhat loosely called fingerprinting codes. Constructions and bounds for fingerprinting codes were studied in [3] [4] [5] , [19] , [20] , [24] , and [33] .
A common feature of the two definitions is the following restriction: (4) At the same time, all previous studies assume that IPP codes (zero-error identification) follow the narrow-sense rule (1), while the more general attack maps (3) necessarily introduce some positive error rate. In this paper, we extend the boundaries of the zero-error problem, showing that there exist IPP codes that can tolerate a positive proportion of coordinates (mutations) in that do not follow their parents in that they deviate from the descent rule (1) by breaking the marking assumption or using the wide-sense attack (3) or both.
B. Robust IPP Codes
Call a coordinate of a mutation if . Assume that the coalition forms following the IPP attack rule (1) except for coordinates that can deviate from this rule. Below, we consider mutations of two types: erasures, when the value is replaced by an unreadable mark, and arbitrary symbol . We also assume that mutations occur either only in detectable coordinates or in all coordinates of . Altogether this accounts for the following four types of attacks.
(I) Only detectable coordinates can mutate (the marking assumption is followed). (II) Only detectable coordinates can mutate, and the mutant coordinates always become unreadable marks (erasures). (III) Any coordinate can mutate to any letter of the alphabet. (IV) Any coordinate can mutate, and the mutant coordinates always become erasures. We note that the attack of type I is sometimes called the arbitrary digit model of fingerprinting [29] .
Let be a coalition. Denote by the set of all vectors formed from the vectors in so that for coordinates and is a mutation in at most coordinates, formed using one of the rules (I)-(IV) above. The following is the main definition of our paper.
Definition 2:
is a -IPP code (robust -IPP code) if
In words, the code guarantees exact identification of at least one member of the pirate coalition of size at most for any collusion attack with at most mutations. Below when the attack rule is not explicitly mentioned, we mean that the code has the IPP property for all the rules (I)-(IV).
Introduce the following quantities:
Let (5) be the critical value of . We use the notation to refer to the critical values for the attacks of type (I)-(IV), respectively. In the hierarchy of attacks that emerges, the second one is the weakest. Generally, the following inequalities are obvious:
The problem addressed in this paper is to determine or bound the critical value of . We find the exact critical values of for the case of two pirates in all the four cases defined above. We also show that if and only if , thereby establishing existence of good robust -IPP codes.
Note that permitting an unlimited number of erasures in detectable positions rules out the existence of good IPP codes. Namely it is easy to show that for any code of cardinality at least , the error probability of identification is close to (see [5, Prop. 2.6] ). For the wide-sense attack (3), identification with zero error is also impossible [5] .
In establishing our results, we rely on properties of combinatorial arrays such as separating families [28] , perfect hash families [12] , [36] and hash codes [7] , and partially hashing families of [6] , all of which are defined formally in the next section. Each of these concepts enforces some kind of separation properties between groups of rows of the array. These properties were previously used in establishing existence results for IPP and fingerprinting codes [1] , [5] , [6] , [23] . To account for the presence of mutant coordinates, we require that the separation properties hold for a certain number of entries of the rows. This leads to the notion of separating distance for an array, which in some particular cases was studied earlier in [7] , [26] , and [28] .
Some of the results of this paper were announced earlier in [37] .
C. Prior Work on Fingerprinting Codes
Fingerprinting codes were first described by Wagner [35] and Blakley et al. [13] and brought to their modern form by Boneh and Shaw [15] . Some of the earlier works on traitor tracing and collusion-secure codes considered the possibility of unreadable marks or of relinquishing the marking assumption or both. In particular, unreadable marks were added to the wide-envelope definition in [15] , permitting some of the detectable coordinates to be erased. However, the present authors observed [5] that this gains no advantage for the pirates. The possibility of adding mutations at a fixed rate (similarly to random errors in information transmission) was considered by Guth and Pfitzmann [22] . Billet and Phan [9] considered Tardos's coding scheme [33] that permits up to mutations (erasures or bit flips), and estimated the rate of fingerprinting codes that support reliable identification of pirates for that scheme (with small, but positive failure probability), and Boneh and Naor [14] and Sirvent [30] did the same for the Boneh-Shaw scheme [15] . They also suggested, for codes that can handle mutations, the term robust, adopted in this study. A recent paper [29] by Škorić et al. discussed various fingerprinting models including some of the ones introduced above, mentioning related work on fingerprinting schemes with nonzero identification error as well as practical motivation of looking beyond the marking assumption in spread spectrum watermarks. We refer to [29] for a more detailed discussion and overview of fingerprinting scheme under various attack scenarios.
D. Contributions of This Paper
The main feature of IPP codes of [23] is the ability to locate exactly one or more members of the coalition. Fingerprinting codes of [15] are resilient against a broader class of attacks by the pirates but allow a certain rate of misidentification of the pirates by the decoder. Our study is motivated by the question to what extent the attacks can be relaxed so that the underlying codes still permit recovery of pirates with zero identification error. To answer this question, we introduce robust IPP codes.
While the concept of robust fingerprinting was considered earlier, for IPP codes it is defined here for the first time.
We consider several types of relaxed attacks and prove that robust -IPP codes of nonzero rate exist for each of them as long as . The proof uses partially hashing families introduced by the authors in [6] . For the case of two pirates, we are able to find the exact asymptotics of the maximum number of mutations for which there exist codes with zero error. The main tool used in the proof is a connection between the IPP property and the hash distance of codes. The hash distance was introduced in a work of the second-named author 15 years ago [7] , and is used here for the first time to address a problem in cryptography.
II. SEPARATING SYSTEMS, PARTIALLY HASHING FAMILIES, HASH CODES
In this section, we collect results on set systems that satisfy a range of conditions similar to perfect hashing. We study separating codes (separating hash families), hash codes (extensions of perfect hash families), and -hashing codes (partially hashing families). We begin with a general notion of separating codes.
Definition 3:
A code is separating of type if for any -tuple of pairwise disjoint subsets for all , there exists a coordinate that separates them: for any
If there are at least coordinates with this property for each choice of the subsets , we say that the code has separating distance .
Alternatively, a separating code is a family of functions , where is a finite set of cardinality , such that for any pairwise disjoint subsets , there exists at least one function such that for all . The condition on the distance is equivalent to the existence of at least such functions for each choice of the subsets .
We will use three special cases of this definition. A code of type is called -separating, a code of type is called a perfect -hash family, and a code of type is called a hashing family (partially hashing family [6] ). In words, a code is -separating if every pair of disjoint subsets of codewords of cardinality and , respectively, is separated in at least one coordinate. A code forms a perfect -hash family if every -tuple of codewords contains a coordinate in which they all have different values. Finally, a partially hashing code is such that for every subsets of the code , there is a coordinate in which all the codewords in are different and are different from every codeword in (at the same time, the codewords in do not have to be separated). The corresponding distances will be denoted by , and , respectively.
Given a separating property , define
A more detailed version of this notation also includes the size of the groups being separated. Thus, for -separating codes, we write and so on.
A. Separating Codes
Separating codes have been studied for a number of years under different names. They were introduced in computer science (see, e.g., [21] ), studied using methods of coding theory and combinatorics (see [17] , [26] , [28] , and [32] ), and more recently introduced in cryptography under the name of frameproof and secure frameproof codes [15] , [31] (the former correspond to separation and the latter to separation). We focus on the case of . The maximum value of the relative -separating distance for which there exist infinite sequences of codes of positive rate is given in the following proposition. 
In particular, for . Part (a) was essentially established in [26] , with a small refinement in [27] . Regarding part (b), Sagalovich [28] establishes a weaker result, namely that for . Bound (9) is proved in the Appendix.
We will also need one extension of the separating property. A code has the restricted separation property if for any two its disjoint subsets , there exists a coordinate such that , and (all the vectors in and in have the same value in the separating coordinate , and these values are different). This version of the separation property was already considered in [26] and [28] . A straightforward application of the probabilistic method gives the following result.
Proposition 2.2: Let
. Infinite sequences of restricted separating codes exist for all rates such that
The proof is given in the Appendix.
B. Perfect Hash Families and Hash Distances of Codes
A perfect -hash family is a set such that for every vectors , there exists such that . Below we call such a hash coordinate.
Using the language of functions, a perfect hash family is a set of functions , where is a finite set of cardinality , such that for any -subset there exists that is one-to-one on . We call a -hash code, often omitting the reference to . The problem of constructing short hash codes of a given cardinality (the most economical collections of functions) has been extensively studied for the last few decades (see [12] , [32] , and [36] ).
A generalization of this concept introduced in [7] studies hash codes with a given value of -hash distance . Note the is the usual Hamming distance of the code. We need several results for -hash codes with a given value of . These results were announced in [7] , but their proofs were never published. Since we rely on them, and to make this paper self-contained, we give them below.
Let (10) The following bound is an analog for the hash distance of the Plotkin bound of coding theory [34, p. 66] , to which it reduces for .
Proposition 2.3 [7] : Let be a code such that . If , then
In particular, any code of length with where satisfies
. Bearing in mind our definition (8), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4: For all
, we have . At the same time, a random choice argument shows that if then .
Proposition 2.5: [7] For any , we have
The proof is given in the Appendix. Because of the last two propositions, we call the value the critical value of the relative -hash distance of codes.
Corollary 2.6:
Let . There exist infinite sequences of codes with the restricted -separating property, -hash distance and any rate that satisfies the inequality This corollary is proved in the Appendix.
Since most existence results in this section rely on a particular application of the probabilistic method, we can similarly claim existence of codes that are simultaneously -separating and hash, or have a certain value of separating distance and of hash distance at the same time. These claims, whose proofs are analogous to the above corollary, will be freely used in what follows.
It is of interest to show that there exist linear IPP codes. Toward this end, we prove that there exist linear 3-hash codes of positive rate.
Proposition 2.7: [7] Let and let be a power of a prime. There exist infinite sequences of -ary linear codes of the rate that have 3-hash distance at least .
Proof: See Appendix. We note that for larger linear hash codes do not exist unless is sufficiently large [7] , [12] .
C. -Hashing Families
A subset is called -hashing [6] if for any two subsets of such that , there is some coordinate such that for any and any , we have . The coordinates whose existence is guaranteed by this definition will be again called hash coordinates for given . As shown in [6] , for any , there exist sequences of good -hashing codes. Here, we establish a generalization of this result. As usual, we say that the code has -hash distance if every pair of subsets has at least hash coordinates. We have the following proposition whose proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.8: Let
and let , where
We have
Remark: In our arguments in this section, we have applied the probabilistic method in its simplest form. It is possible to improve some of the results stated above relying on more refined arguments. For instance, Alon et al. [1] observed that under biased selection of code symbols, the probability can be shown to be . This number is smaller than the right-hand side of (13), and so the values of for which can be larger than in the above proposition. Better rates of some binary -separating codes for , with no consideration of the separating distance, were found in [17] (again, biased selection helps).
Several nonasymptotic improvements of the application of the probabilistic method for perfect hash families and other combinatorial arrays were considered by Blackburn and Wilde [12] and Deng et al. [18] .
III. EXISTENCE OF ROBUST IPP CODES

A. Robust IPP Codes With Traceability Property
Denote by the Hamming distance between vectors . The minimum distance between distinct codewords will be called the (Hamming) distance of the code and denoted . The value is called the relative code distance. We also use the notation for the number of equal coordinates in the vectors. Finally, for , we write . For instance, a descendant of a coalition with mutant coordinates is any vector that satisfies . Some of the known results for -IPP codes can be easily generalized to the new problem. For instance, Chor et al. [16] showed that any code with Hamming distance is a -IPP code. A generalization is as follows. (14), we obtain the inequality .
Returning to our main problem, we obtain the following corollary of Proposition 3.1.
Corollary 3.3: For any
, we have
B. Existence of Robust -IPP Codes for
Traceability is a more restrictive property than IPP: it is shown in [6] that -IPP codes with positive rate exist over smaller-sized alphabets than -TA codes. More specifically, Barg et al. [6] prove that good -IPP codes exist for all , and that this bound is exact. The following generalization of this result to -IPP codes holds true. (15) where is the -hash distance of . Then, the total number of mutations that can be introduced by the coalitions in is at most , and therefore, there exists at least one -hash coordinate. Then, the previous lemma implies the -IPP property.
Proposition 2.8 implies that as long as , there exist sequences of codes of rate approaching and -hash distance . For a given , it suffices to consider the value because if . Let be a set of real numbers. By the remark made after Corollary 2.6, there exist codes of positive rate and -hash distance simultaneously for all . To conclude, for any set of positive real numbers such that , there exist sequences of codes of positive rate and hash distance . These codes have the IPP property for all that satisfy which proves our claim.
IV. HASH DISTANCES AND UPPER BOUNDS FOR ROBUST IPP CODES
In this section, we derive upper bounds on under the marking assumption. For that, we show that for in the case of erasures and for in the case of arbitrary mutations, exact identification is impossible, thus rendering for these values of .
Theorem 4.1:
Proof: Consider an arbitrary code and let be its st hash distance. Take a subset and let be the set of its hash coordinates (the coordinates in which all the vectors of are different). Form a vector such that if if where is the most frequent symbol among . Since for at least two values of , we have for any -subset . Thus, it is impossible to identify a parent of with certainty.
Turning to mutant coordinates of arbitrary value (but still following the marking assumption), let us partition into disjoint, (almost) equal parts:
Consider the vector such that if if
where has the same meaning as above. Clearly, can be generated by any -subset of using at most mutations. By Proposition 2.4, any code sequence with positive rate must have . Together with (5), this implies our claims.
V. ROBUST 2-IPP CODES
Existence of good -IPP codes for some positive has been already established in Theorem 3.4. However, its proof uses only a sufficient condition for the robust IPP property, not resulting in an optimal value of . In this section, we strengthen this result, finding the exact value of for all the four versions of the problem considered.
Hollmann et al. [23] provided a characterization of 2-IPP codes in terms of their separating properties. We start with extending this analysis to the case of robust IPP codes. We write to refer to a pair of vectors from . We also use an abbreviated notation (instead of ) to refer to the set of vectors that can be generated by the vectors following (1) in nonmutant coordinates and following one of the rules (I)-(IV) of Section I in creating mutations.
For a code , we write omitting the subscript . For a vector , consider a graph , where and if . By definition, the code can identify at least one of the pirates if and only if for any the graph is a star (all the edges in intersect on a point).
Proposition 5.1:
, the graph has no triangles and any two edges have a common vertex.
This proposition is an easy generalization of Lemma 1 from [23] . According to it, is -IPP if it is simultaneously 3-hash and (2,2)-separating. Switching to the language of graphs, this means that for any , the graph contains no triangles and no two edges that do not intersect on a vertex.
First we study the case when mutations occur only in detectable coordinates. (6) that . At the same time, if two pairs of codewords have (2,2) separating distance , and is an attack vector in which the separating coordinates are erased, then the graph has both edges and , so exact identification is impossible. However, by (9) , the rate of any sequence of codes with approaches 0. This shows that (16) holds with equality, proving the first part of the claim. Now let us consider arbitrarily valued mutations of Case (III). The arguments are analogous to the first part and lead to the equality where . For instance, assuming that each of the two pairs can alter at most positions, the condition suffices to rule out parallel edges, so , etc.
Finally, notice that restricting our choice to linear codes (for field-sized alphabets ) does not change the values of found in the last theorem. This is because standard ensembles of random linear codes with high probability have both -separating and 3-hash properties as long as the separating and hash distances are less than their critical values and , respectively. In particular, from the last two theorems, we get the following values for the critical rate of mutations for in -IPP codes:
These critical values can be attained by sequences of ternary linear codes. (17) where the sum extends to all the -tuples of distinct symbols from the alphabet. Indeed, choosing one vector out of each of the sets for a fixed -tuple accounts for a -tuple of codevectors for which is a hash coordinate. The right-hand side of (17) This follows from the Pinsker inequality or alternatively, from the Hoeffding bound (see, e.g., [25] ). Slightly better estimates are possible (the Chernov bound [25] or the estimate [8] ), but we will opt for the above computationally simple bound.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: Consider a random code of cardinality whose codeword coordinates are chosen uniformly and independently from . The probability that a given coordinate is hash for a -subset equals . Since the events {coordinate is -hash} are independent for different , the probability that is bad (contains fewer than hash coordinates) can be bounded by (18) as follows:
The expected number of bad -tuples equals . From this point on, we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2.2. As a result, we claim that with probability , a random code of size will contain not more than bad -tuples. Deleting one codeword from each of them leaves a code of cardinality with no bad -tuples, i.e., with -hash distance at least .
Proof of Corollary 2.6: Consider a random code of cardinality
From the proofs of Propositions 2.2 and 2.5 with , the code contains fewer than quadruples of codewords that fail the restricted separation property and fewer than -tuples of codewords that contain fewer than hash coordinates. Deleting at most codewords from the code , we obtain a code with the claimed hash and separating properties. For given and , we clearly can find large enough so that the code has rate .
Proof of Proposition 2.7: Construct a random linear matrix whose elements are chosen from independently and uniformly, and consider the -linear space of cardinality . Denote by the columns of . Then, a codevector can be written as , where
. Consider any three different codevectors . Since being 3-hash is a translation invariant property, we assume without any loss of generality that . Let and , where . Case 1: If and are not collinear, then the probability that a given coordinate is 3-hash equals . Hence, the probability that the triple contains fewer than hash coordinates equals Case 2: If , then the probability that a given -th coordinate is 3-hash equals and the probability that the triple contains fewer than hash coordinates satisfies . Using the union bound, there exists a linear code with 3-hash distance if , and at least a proportion of linear codes have this property if This yields the following condition on the code rate:
Proof of Proposition 2.8: The proof proceeds analogously to Proposition 2.5 if one observes that, under the uniform distribution for the selection of the code symbols, the probability that a given coordinate is not hash for a given pair of subsets depends only on their cardinalities and equals . The expected number of bad choices of the subsets equals The probability that a random code contains more than such choices is not more than which equals for . Deleting one vector from each pair of subsets , we obtain a -hashing code with and cardinality .
